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yield also to the less advantageous provisions of the same statute.
In effect the legislation would establish the property as abandoned,
after the one year has elapsed, thereby creating in the finder a title
paramount to the loser's. It can not be fairly contended that a loser
who makes no effort to reclaim his chattel has not abandoned it.
Clearly, the statute could have no retroactive effect. Prospectively
it would be valid as to residents of the state who lose property, but
a problem might be anticipated as to non-residents. That is, may a
non-resident who loses property here be deprived of it by operation
of the statute?
Irrespective of the constitutional difficulties which may be encountered, a statute, clearly defining the rights and duties of a finder,
is preferable to the nebulous status of a finder in this state, where,
if the presumptions enumerated above prevail, a finder may be vested
with title only after six years. If he does not hold adversely, his
property is always subject to divestment by the true owner. A statute
modeled after the Massachusetts statute is undeniably advantageous
and would erase an existing anomaly in the law. It is not contended
that the one-year limitation, as prescribed in the Massachusetts statute, would be a satisfactory period in this state, since the size and
population of the state are factors to be taken into account. Such
determination rests properly in the legislature. It is submitted, however, that a finder, who has complied with the law and in good faith
given a true owner every opportunity to recover his chattel, is entitled to something more than an ownership "good against all but
the rightful owner."
WILLIAM J. HARRIS.
PARENTAL

LIABILITY FOR INCAPABLE MINOR CHILD'S
OF AUTOMOBILE

OPERATION

As an elementary principle, a parent is not liable for the torts of
his minor children unless they are committed at his direction or
authorized by him or subsequently ratified by him. This principle is
subject to certain well known exceptions. Thus, a statute may impose liability on the parent regardless of his culpability,' or the act
of the parent in relation to the child and the ensuing tort may have
been negligent of itself.2
1 CAL. VEH. CODE § 352 (b)-"Minor's Negligence Imputed to Parent in
Certain Cases. Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor whether licensed or not under this code in driving a motor vehicle upon a highway with
the express or implied permission of the parents or the person or guardian
having custody of the minor shall be imputed to such parents or such person
or guardian for all purposes of civil damages and such parents or such person
or guardian shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any
damages proximately resulting from such negligence or wilful misconduct."
2 HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 283, p. 622.
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Under the latter exception has arisen the rule that a parent who
entrusts a dangerous chattel to a child may be liable to injured third
parties as a result of the child's misconduct with the dangerous chattel.8 The cases on this point generally involve liability arising out of
dangerous instrumentalities such as firearms or explosives. 4 It is
usually held that the parent need not actually entrust the weapon to
the child; it is enough if he leave it in such a place that the use of it
by the child and the danger to persons of the class likely to be in the
vicinity is reasonably foreseeable. 5 Such foreseeability of harm need
not relate to the precise person injured or to the precise manner of
injury; it is enough that an unreasonable risk of harm in some manner to a class of persons is foreseeable. 6 Perhaps the leading case
involving this principle is Sullivan v. Creed.7 There the defendant
had left his gun, loaded and at full cock, leaning against a fence on
his own lands near a path leading to a public highway. The defendant's son, aged 15, passed along the path and took the gun to the
highway. Not knowing it to be loaded, he playfully pointed it at the
plaintiff. The gun was discharged and the plaintiff suffered the injuries complained of. The Court of King's bench held for the plaintiff and this rule was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the King's
Bench decision, Judge Gibson wrote as follows:
Our decision depends on the answer to the question, was the misfortune
the direct consequence of a danger which a prudent man ought to have perceived? It is immaterial that the specific mischief was not actually foreseen.
The possessor of a dangerous article is bound to exercise diligence for the
protection of those likely to be injured by a probable use of such article.
Thus, there is actionable liability where the vendor of a dangerous commodity,
without warning, sells it to a purchaser presumably unaware of such danger:
Clarke v. Army and Navy Co-operative Society, Limited (1903), 1 K. B. 155;
where a master entrusts to a young and unfit messenger a gun negligently left
loaded which it was his duty to have made safe: Dixon v. Bell, 5 M & S
198. . . . The master in Dixon v. Bell, 5 M & S 198, never thought for a
moment that the girl, after laying aside the gun (which he had been led to
believe was safe), would unexpectedly have taken it up again and pointed it
at the child. The argument that tie handling and use of the gun were trespassory and unauthorized is also inadmissible, as the cases demonstrate.

This case stands for the rule that conduct is negligent when the
actor creates a situation which is unreasonably dangerous to others
because8 of the likelihood of the action of third parties or inanimate
forces.

3Dickens

v. Branham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356 (1920).

4 Sullivan v. Creed, (1904) 1 Ir. R. 317.
5 HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 8.
6City

of Dixon v. Scott, 181 Ill. 116, 54 N. E. 897 (1899) ; HAR'E,

OF TORTS (1933) §75.
7 (1904) 1 Ir. R. 317.
8 RESTATEMENT, TORTS

(1934)

§ 302 (b).
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The question is presented whether these principles apply to cases
where the chattel, though not dangerous per se, is likely to be put to a
dangerous use because of the user's known propensities. 9 Logically,
it would seem that to ask the question is to answer it. And, courts
have held, with fair uniformity, that the entrusting of such a nondangerous article to an unfit or reckless person constitutes negligence
if such person is likely to use it in a dangerous manner."0 In the
case of parents, the duty is affirmative-not merely negative-and the
parent is under a duty:
(1) To refrain from giving the child such a chattel; 11 and,
(2) To take positive action to prevent the child from using

1

it. 2

This rule has been applied to the allowing of insane persons,'8
drunkards, 14 known reckless drivers,'8 or inexperienced minors, 16 the
use of automobiles. Although by the great weight of authority a car
is not a dangerous instrumentality of itself,'1 liability has been imposed on the owners of cars when they have permitted the above
classes of persons to use them.' 8
In Rocca v. Steinmetz,"" the California court held that an owner
who permits his son to use the family car with knowledge that the
son was a careless and reckless driver is guilty of negligence and
hence is liable for all damages caused by the son in the operation of
the machine. To the same effect is Knight v. Gosselin,20 wherein it
was held that liability extended to the owner in a case where he permitted a known drunkard to use his automobile. In this situation it

9 By the great weight of authority an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality per se. Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150 (1912);
Rocca v. Steinmetz, 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923).
10 The cases are collected in the annotation to 36 A. L. R. 1150, 1162
(1925); 42 C. J. § 836, n. 54; BERRY, THE LAW OF AuTomoIrEs (5th Ed.)
§ 1351 ("Thus, if a parent should place an automobile in charge of a child of
tender years, who is incompetent and unable on account of his youth to safely
operate such a machine, he will be held liable for injuries caused thereby.
But this liability is on account of his own negligence in entrusting his automobile to the child and does not arise from any imputed negligence of the
child.")
11 Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933 (1898).
12 HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 283,
13 McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. (2d)

p. 622.

546, 109 P. (2d) 358 (1940).
Knight v. Gosselin, 1Z4 Cal. App. 290, 12 P. (2d) 454 (1932).
15 Kanananakoa v. Badalamente, 119 Cal. App. 231, 6 P. (2d) 338 (1931).
10 Rocca v. Steinmetz, 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923).
17 See note 9 supra.
18 See notes 13 through 16 supra.
2961 Cal. App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923).
14

20

124 Cal. App. 290, 12 P. (2d) 454 (1932).

1946 ]

NOTES AND COMMENT

was held that liability was independent of the "imputed negligence"
statute.2 1
II
The above cases and authorities clearly delineate the proposition
that the liability of the parent or other lender is based on a dual
theory:
(1) His ow& (as distinguished from imputed) negligence in entrusting the vehicle to the known recdless driver or in permitting it
to remain in such a position that the natural consequence is injury to
others through the acts of third parties; 22 and,
(2) The negligence of the inexperienced minor child (or other
intervening
actor whose intervention was foreseeable) in injuring the
23
plaintiff.
21 CAL. VEH. CODE § 402(a)--"Liability of Private Owners.
Every owner
of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to

person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner, and
the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes
of civil damages."
22 See note 8 supra. The history of decisional law in California reveals an
interesting discrepancy. Prior to the decision in Rocca v. Steinmetz, 61 Cal.
App. 102, 214 Pac. 257 (1923), it had been held that a parent was not liable
where he permitted his child to have access to a firearm and the child negligently shot someone. (Figone v. Guisti, 43 Cal. App. 606, 185 Pac. 694 (1919) ;
Hagerty v. Powers, 66 Cal. 368, 5 Pac. 622 (1885).)
Examination of the
brief filed by the respondent-defendants in the Rocca case indicates that this
line of decisions was strongly relied on as a defense in that action. Respondents stated that if a parent was not liable for handing a gun to his minor
child-or in permitting him access thereto-that by no means should a parent
be held liable, in the absence of statute, for entrusting an automobile to a
child which in turn resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The Court rejected
this theory and attempted to distinguish between the two classes of cases. The
principle was thus settled in California law that a parent may be liable for
negligently allowing his minor child to operate the parent's automobile.
Analysis of the prior firearms cases indicates that the California Supreme
Court was not fully cognizant of tort legal history. The Court went so far
as to say that liability of the parent (in the firearms situation) was unknown
to the common law. This was not the case. Examination of Sullivan v. Creed,
(1904) 1 Ir. R. 317, clearly indicates that the California Supreme Court did not
extend its research far enough; for, the Sullivan case shows that the principle was fully recognized in many cases-most of which antedate the Hagerty
and Figone decisions. At least in England the rule of strict liability (or
negligent liability) had grown up in regard to the entrustment of dangerous
chattels. To carry this process but one step farther and extend liability to
instrumentalities that may become dangerous through improper operation, is a
logical and reasonable extension of the doctrine involving no new principle,
nor, in fact, does it need particular justification to exist as a valid legal
premise.
23 If the injury to the plaintiff were a pure accident, liability could not be
imposed on the parent for although he would be negligent to all men in general in permitting the child to operate the car, nevertheless that negligence
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Implicit in these holdings is the fact that the rule does not depend
on the application of the doctrine of respondeat superioras such doctrine is clearly inapposite to this genus of case. 24 Here there is no
need of the rules pertaining to master and servant or principal and
agent. If these doctrines were applicable, the cases could be resolved
purely by the application of the doctrine.
This presents the important question: Are the cases solved or
controlled by another form of imputed liability found in the common
statutes such as Section 59 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law? 25 These statutes are remedial in nature and apply where the
doctrine of respondeat superior is not available as where the wrongdoer merely has possession of the car and is not an agent or servant
of the owner. Such statutes are designed to meet the felt necessities
of the times, and under them a lender who has allowed a perfectly
competent driver to take the car has the negligence of such borrower
imputed to him.2

6

Hence, the general rule of a bailment that the

privity is that of property and not of contract is avoided. It has
is not alone controlled
been held that the type of case under 2discussion
7
by the "imputed negligence" statute.

could not reasonably be said to have been the legal cause of the injury, assuming that it were in fact unavoidable. For, even though an act may be a
breach of legal duty, it still must be a legal cause. (Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad, 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 [1928].) If the child were
not negligent in injuring the plaintiff, then it cannot be said that the negligence of the parent in permitting the incompetent to operate the vehicle was
a legal cause, for the negligent act of the parent presupposes that the child
will negligently injure someone, and thus to hold the parent liable for the
child's non-negligent act would be to extend liability farther than that which
was reasonably foreseeable. Even the statutes imposing liability on the parent
regardless of his fault recognize this. (See note 1 supra.) In sum, the liability of the parent is predicated on his own negligence and on the theory
that the child will negligently injure someone. Furthermore, it is relatively
hard to conceive a situation where the parent would be liable and the child
would not. Hence the act of the parent might have been a cause in fact;
it might have been the sine qua non without which the injury would not have
happened. Nevertheless, for reasons of policy and practicality the line is
drawn. See Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292 (Mass. 1850). It was the prevailing rule of the common law that neither trespass nor case would lie save
where there was fault. See The Nitroglycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 21 L. ed.
206 (1872) ; Burkes v. Lieberman, 218 App. Div. 600, 218 N. Y. Supp. 593
(1st Dep't 1926), aft'd, 245 N. Y. 579, 157 N. E. 865 (1927).
24 Gardiner v. Solomon, 200 Ala. 115, 75 So. 621 (1917); the same conclusion is reached by the annotator in 36 A. L. R. 1162 (1925).
25 N. Y. VEH. AND TRAF. LAW § 59-"Negligence of operator other than
owner attributable to owner. Every owner of a motor vehicle or motor cycle
operated upon a public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or
injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of
such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the same
with the permission, express or implied, of such owner."
26 Fluegel v. Coudert, 244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 683 (1927).
27 McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. (2d) 546, 109 P. (2d) 358 (1941).
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Why is it important or noteworthy that such statutes are not
(or should not be) controlling in the cases of negligent permission to
incapable drivers to operate automobiles? The answer is two-fold:
(1) From the standpoint of the injured plaintiff it is vitally
important, for:
(a) In many jurisdictions the lender's liability is limited if
the case is decided under an imputed negligence statute. For
example, California Vehicle Code, Section 402, linits liability to
$5,000.00 where one person is injured or killed and, where more
than one is injured or killed, the total liability may not exceed
$10,000.00.28

(b) Even if the case is to be decided under an imputed
negligence section which does not limit liability in money damages (for example, Section 59 of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law), the plaintiff is likewise subject to the defense that
the borrower was operating the vehicle outside of the scope of
the express or implied permission. In sum, secret restrictions
may operate so as to negative liability. Normally, such a defense is a complete one.
(2) Secondly, it is important that liability be not controlled by
such statutes from the standpoint of social policy.
It is with the matters noted in (1) above that this note is principally concerned. A typical situation might be presented as follows:
Assume that by the.decisional law of State X it is negligent conduct to permit a known reckless person to operate your car. Nevertheless, a parent permits his careless or reckless minor child to operate the family car. However, he tells the minor: "You may use the
car here in town, but don't go to Easton." The child does drive to
the forbidden town and a collision occurs due to the sole negligence
of the minor. The plaintiffs suffered serious injuries for which
$20,000 would be adequate compensation. There is an imputed negligence statute in State X which limits the lender's liability to $5,000
or $10,000. The decisional law of State X also holds that a lender
may delimit the area of operation of the loaned vehicle and that transgression of this area is a defense available to the lender. Is the lender
liable on any theory? If so, in what amount?
28 CAL. VEI. CODE § 402(b)--"The liability of an owner for imputed negligence imposed by this section and not arising through the relationship of
principal and agent or master and servant is limited to the amount of five
thousand dollars ($5,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one
accident and subject to said limit as to one person is limited to the amount
of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) with respect to the death of or injury to

more than one person in any one accident and is limited to the sum of one

thousand dollars ($1,000)
accident."

for damage to property of others in any one
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It is submitted that the only proper result is one in which the
lender is held completely liable. As indicated there are authorities
holding that the situation is independent of the imputed negligence
statutes. 29 However, would restrictions be available as a defense?
Or, are there any authorities holding expressly, or by implication,
that the case would be solely decided under an imputed negligence
statute?
It is well settled that under the common imputed negligence statutes the owner may place reasonable restrictions on the operation of
the vehicle.3 0 Such secret restrictions include: the designation of a
forbidden area of operation; 31 prohibition against the picking up of
33
riders; 32 the length of time for which the vehicle may be used;
34
and, the purpose for which the vehicle may be used.
Such secret
restrictions have been held to be valid as complete defenses against
injured third parties.3 5 The ratio decidendi of this current of judicial
thought appears to be that such statutes are in derogation of the
common law and hence must be strictly construed against undue
enlargement of liability.3 6 Further, the common law allowed the
owner of a vehicle to place restrictions on its use; the statutes do not
expressly change this rule, hence it still exists. However, in a recent
California case,37 Judge Carter, in his concurring opinion served notice
that he was ready to discard the rules relating to secret restrictions.
In the light of the above, the recent New York case of Winnowski
v. Polito 38 raises significant and provocative issues which may well
compel a complete restatement of the law relating to permissive use
in New York. In addition, it seemingly introduces a new concept
relating to the presumption of authorized use. The facts were as
follows: The owner of the vehicle double-parked it on a busy thoroughfare in the shopping district of Albany. He left the key in the
ignition switch and the car wheels were turned to the curb. The
owner and his wife entered a nearby store, leaving their 14-year-old
son sitting in the rear of the car. The boy moved up into the front
seat of the car. He testified that while sitting there a policeman
directed him to move the car to the curb. The boy protested that he
had no license and did not know how to drive. The policeman was
See note 27 suPra.
Psota v. Long Island Railroad, 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927).
31 Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1929).
32 Psota v. Long Island Railroad, 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927).
29

30

33Union Trust Co. v. American Commercial Car Co., 219 Mich. 557, 189
N. W. 23 (1922).
Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N. Y. 211, 179 N. E. 389 (1932).
s5 Rhodes v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp., 239 App. Div. 92, 266
N. Y. Supp. 681 (4th Dep't 1933).
36 Psota v. Long Island Railroad, 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927),
("The Legislature may not be presumed to make any innovation upon the
common law further than is required by the mischief to be remedied").
37 Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. (2d) 239, 158 P. (2d) 393 (1945).
38294 N. Y. 159, 61 N. E. (2d) 425 (1945).
34
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adamant and the boy stepped on the starter. As the car was in gear
it ran forward over the curb and struck the plaintiffs. The testimony
of the boy was uncontradicted. The mother and father testified that
the boy was forbidden to drive and that no permission to drive had
ever been given him. This testimony was also uncontradicted. The
policeman was not called as a witness. The trial court found for the
plaintiffs on the ground that the prin facie case created by the presumption of authorized use with the owner's permission had not been
overcome. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the Appellate Division, 89 upheld the trial court.
Seemingly, the basis of the Court of Appeals decision was that:
(1) it was within the discretion of the trial court, weighing the testimony of the interested witnesses, to hold that the presumption of
authorized use had not been overcome; and (2) the leaving of a
vehicle on a street under such circumstances gives implied permission
to a person left in charge to operate it.
Little fault can be found with the result; in fact, it is submitted
that it is the only correct result under the cases and authorities heretofore cited. In sum, the result is correct because the parent negligently allowed the vehicle to be left in such a position that the use of
it by the incapable child was reasonably foreseeable.
It is the ratio decidendi that warrants criticism. There can be
little doubt, as a general rule, that a presumption of authorized use
arises from the mere operation of the vehicle.40 And, the credibility
of witnesses who testify in opposition to this presumption is for the
trier of fact.41 Had the decision been placed solely on that ground,
the reasoning might be acceptable even though a presumption ordinarily should not be given undue effect in the face of circumstances
clearly rendering the effect of such presumption an unusual result.
Particularly is this so of a statutory presumption not having a logical
core as its basis. 42 It would seem safe to state that it is relatively
difficult to presume permission to a known incapable minor child,
under these circumstances, to drive the car. The probabilities are
against such express permission; in all the cases where express permission existed there was clear evidence of such permission. But
here there is none. It is unequivocally denied. Nor should it be
presumed that reasonable people do give such permission unless there
are some facts in evidence warranting the inference or presumption.
In the absence, as here, of any evidence of permission save for the
actual fact of an accident, it seems an unreasonable and unwarranted
inference.
39
Winnowski v. Polito, 267 App. Div. 849, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (3d
Dep't 1944).

40 St. Andrassy v. Mooney, 262 N. Y. 368, 186 N. E. 867 (1933).

Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915).
O'TooLE, CASES AND MATmIu.S ox THE LAW oF EVrDENCE (2d ed. 1937),
p. 57: "By the weight of authority a presumption is not evidence, but a rule
4412

70

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

Apparently this was felt by the court for it attempted to find
other bases of justification to bolster up the fictional presumption.
There may well have been a lurking doubt-what if the patrolman
had testified in corroboration of the child? What if it had actually
happened that way? How then could it be said that there was operation with permission when the child protested vigorously against
operating the car. This would not be operation with permission.
Rather it would be operation under duress of law. True, we do not
know why the policeman did not testify; that we are not told. Inferentially, perhaps, he may not have existed; or, if he did exist, a
sense of self protection might render his testimony unfavorable to
the defendant. But regardless of these speculations, to allow credibility to oppose, as a negativing factor, the clear and unequivocal testimony of no consent taken in conjunction with the unusual manner of
the accident, is difficult to justify. 43 Hence, it was necessary for the
court to find implied permission in order to have a basis upon which
to predicate liability.44 To do so, the court stated (per Dye, J.) :
While it is not easy to formulate a universally applicable definition as to the
meaning of implied permission mentioned in the statute, it must be recognized
as a basic proposition that when one leaves his motor vehicle in a busy street
in such a position that a reasonably prudent person should anticipate that in
the event of an emergency or other necessity, it must be moved, it imposes
upon the
owner responsibility for the negligent acts of the person left in
45
charge.
To the author it would seem that implied permission is more
than merely mentioned in the statute; it would seem that it is a condition precedent to liability and is required. Is this not in the teeth of
the statute and of prior decisions long regarded as binding? 46 Permission at the very least connotes an intent to allow the bailee the use
of the vehicle. Again, is it not unusual and improbable to state that
a parent would impliedly permit (that is, intentionally) his known
incapable minor child to drive as here? Is it natural or probable to
think that a parent would think to himself: "I'll let the child drive it

of evidence. In order, therefore, to understand the effect of proof in rebuttal
to a presumption, it becomes necessary to distinguish between those presumptions which are arbitrarily created such as an arbitrary presumption that a
motor vehicle is being operated in the owner's service, and those which result
from a series of facts admitting of a logical deduction, such as the presumption of death after seven years absence under circumstances tending to negative
the existence of fife."
43 Christiansen v. Hilber, 282 Mich. 403, 276 N. W. 495 (1937);
St. Andrassy v. Mooney, 262 N. Y. 368, 186 N. E. 867 (1933).
44 See note 25 supra.
45 294 N. Y. 159, at 162.
- If intentional permission is not required why have the courts before
allowed reasonable restrictions to be put on the use of the vehicle? The very
concept of restrictions implies intent on the part of the lender to let the
vehicle for certain purposes. See cases cited in notes 30-36, incl., supra.

1946 ]

NOTES AND COMMENT

if necessary, although I know full well he doesn't know how to
drive"? Yet, that is what the court holds in its decision. That this
is highly unusual and improbable matters not. The fact that it has
formerly been held that implied permission under the statute meant
express permission circumstantially proved is in limbo. 47 And here
there was not a scintilla of evidence to support express permission or
implied intentional permission.
Apparently the court failed to see that the true basis of liability
was outside of the statute and merely consisted of the actual negligence of the parent in leaving the vehicle as he did. What should
have been said is that the parent should have foreseen that which was
reasonably foreseeable: namely, the necessity for moving the car and
that that moving might be done by one incapable of driving, such as
his minor child. It would be immaterial that he did not actually
foresee this, as a reasonable man he should have. Hence he would
be liable for failing to take affirmative action. The recovery then
would have been on actual negligence and not on a strained interpretation of a statute never intended to cover such an anomalous situation.
We are thus left with two vital issues:
(1) Has the rule as to reasonable (secret) restrictions been
abolished ?
(2) Does the court mean to hold that a parent may be held liable
for the negligent operation of his vehicle by an incapable child solely
under the provisions of Section 59?
A combination of a negative answer to (1) and an affirmative
answer to (2) would result in freeing the parent from liability in the
problem case set forth above. That this would be an unjust and
unworkable result can be garnered from logic and history. The very
nature of the case precludes such a result. It must be regarded as
sound law that the "secret restrictions" rule and the imputed negligence statutes cannot and should not apply in cases of this nature.
As previously stated, the act of the parent is negligence in itself,
because of the reasonably apparent (foreseeable) and probable consequence of harm to persons as a result of his failure to take steps
which would have prevented the use of the chattel by the minor. The
purport of the statutes is to embrace the innocent lender; they never
were intended to apply to a party whose own negligence was a cause
in fact of the disaster. Nor is there want of a historical reason.
Consideration must be given to the factors which have allowed the
"secret restrictions" rule to stand even though it is socially desirable
that injured parties be compensated for their injuries wherever possible. Under the Anglo-American system of law, before a defendant
47
Atwater v. Lober, 133 Misc. 652, 233 N. Y. Supp. 309 (Cayuga County
Ct. 1929); Houlihan v. Selengut, 175 Misc. 854, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 371 (Sup.
Ct. 1941), reversed, 263 App. Div. 811, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 560 (1st Dep't 1941).
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may be charged with money damages it must first be shown (save in
the exceptional cases of strict liability) that he has in some way been
negligent or that he intentionally caused the harm. 48 This result
stems from the nature of trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case.
Save for an early formative period, trespass never lay without fault
or guilty intent on the part of the defendant. There had to be transgression in a sinful (moral) sense or liability was not present. 49 Thus,
the historical reason is the key to the exception in the statutory imputed negligence statutes: they impose liability without fault, hence,
any possible defense should be permitted and encouraged. Conversely,
if the defendant were at fault the exception should not be allowed for
that would amount to "no liability even though you are at fault."
Hence, there being no fiction of identity between the defendant
and the wrongdoer (as there would be in agency and like vicarious
relationships) and as the relation was that of property, the fault
would not be carried over except where the statute applied. And as
the statute says: "with the permission, express or implied, of the
owner.. .", the concept of permissive use naturally called into play a
subjective approach and the subjective role of restrictions could be
invoked to show that the permission was transcended.
Logically the "secret restrictions" rule is inapposite in relation
to dangerous instrumentalities or where the defendant's relation to a
non-dangerous instrumentality capable of doing harm in the hands of
an incompetent person is, in fact, extra-hazardous, 50 in that such
conduct involves an unreasonable risk to persons at large and is negligent. This underlying philosophy is clearly indicated in the foregoing
case of Sullivan v. Creed51 where the court held that the fact that the
taking was trespassory or unauthorized could not be relied on by the
defendant as a defense and was inadmissible for such a purpose.
Why not? Because the defendant's liability was based on the fact
that he foresaw, or should have foreseen, that his conduct involved
the probability of harm to persons who might be expected in that
vicinity and that such foreseeability of harm extended even to an
unauthorized or trespassory use of the instrument.
Conclusion
The Winnowski decision must be viewed as aberrational; the
foregoing analysis demonstrates, it is believed, the errors and dangers
implicit in the enunciated rule. Yet, the case cannot be considered
as overruling sub silentio the previous line of decisions under the
48
49

See note 23 supra.
HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAw (1881), p. 89.

"Tresspass and Negligence."

"In spite, however, of all the arguments which may be urged for the rule that
a man acts at his peril, it has been rejected by very eminent courts, even under
the old forms of action."
50 See REsTATEmENT, TORTs (1934) §§ 316, 317.
51 (1904) 1 Ir. R. 317.

1946 ]

NOTES AND COMMENT

statute permitting the lender to place reasonable restrictions on the
use of the vehicle; neither should it be viewed as holding that the
parental liability for allowing an incompetent minor access to a vehicle
or expressly permitting the operation thereof, is solely controlled by
Section 59. The decision must be regarded as an inadvertence of
the true principles involved. The rule must then be viewed as one
not supported by principle or authority and should be repudiated at
the earliest opportunity. Barring this, the effect on the decisional
law in the future may be significant.
KEITH S. SuTroN.

50 AND 51 OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW TO WORD PICTURES

THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS

NEW YORK

Decisions of the state and federal courts have led to some confusion as regards the proper interpretation to be accorded Sections
50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. These sections provide that any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
his written consent, first obtained, may sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use. They also provide for
the granting of injunctive relief and contain a penal element.'
The point in controversy is whether or not the words "portrait"
and "picture" as used in the above sections apply to a word-painting.
Does a graphic description of an individual wherein he is identifiable
by reference to appearance, habits or details of his private life constitute a picture or a portrait within the purview of the act?
This question has never been passed upon either by the state
or federal courts. Statements made by the courts by way of dicta,
however, intimate that such a portraiture published without the consent of the 2subject would be sufficient to support an action under
this statute.
Were it not for two circumstances these dicta might be of no
great significance. But the cases construing these statutes are as
yet so few in number that these casual expressions of opinion assume
an importance out of proportion to the weight that would ordinarily
be accorded such statements in a better documented branch of the
law. They are even more significant when considered from the
standpoint of their possible effect in circumscribing the right of the
individual to complete freedom of expression.
IN.
Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51.
2
See Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures,

Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. C N. Y.
1944) ; Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 57, 103 N. E. 1108, 1110 (1913).

